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The Infamy Speech was a speech delivered by United States President Franklin D. Roosevelt to a Joint Session of Congress on December 8, 1941, one day after the Empire of Japan's attack on Pearl Harbor, Hawaii.〔(Presidential Materials, September 11: Bearing Witness to History, Smithsonian Institution (2002) ) ("Printed copy of Presidential address to Congress Reminiscent of Franklin D. Roosevelt's address to Congress after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor")〕〔Address by the President of the United States, December 8, 1941, in ''Declarations of a State of War with Japan, Germany, and Italy'', Senate Document No. 148 (77th Congress, 1st Session), at p. 7, reprinted at (the University of Virginia School of Law project page, Peter DeHaven Sharp, ed. )〕〔See Senate Document No. 148 (77th Congress, 1st Session), in ''Congressional Serial Set'' (1942)〕〔William S. Dietrich, (''In the shadow of the rising sun: the political roots of American economic decline'' (1991), p. xii. )〕〔Franklin Odo, ed., (''The Columbia documentary history of the Asian American experience'', p. 77. )〕 The name derives from the first line of the speech: Roosevelt describing the previous day as "a date which will live in infamy". The speech is also commonly referred to as the "Pearl Harbor Speech." Within an hour of the speech, Congress passed a formal declaration of war against Japan and officially brought the U.S. into World War II. The address is one of the most famous of all American political speeches.〔"(FDR's "Day of Infamy" Speech: Crafting a Call to Arms )", ''Prologue'' magazine, US National Archives, Winter 2001, Vol. 33, No. 4.〕 == Commentary == The Infamy Speech was brief, running to just a little over seven minutes. Secretary of State Cordell Hull had recommended that the President devote more time to a fuller exposition of Japanese-American relations and the lengthy but unsuccessful effort to find a peaceful solution. However, Roosevelt kept the speech short in the belief that it would have a more dramatic effect.〔Robert J. Brown, ''Manipulating the Ether: The Power of Broadcast Radio in Thirties America'', pp. 117–120. McFarland & Company, 1998. ISBN 0-7864-2066-9.〕 His revised statement was all the stronger for its emphatic insistence that posterity would forever endorse the American view of the attack. It was intended not merely as a personal response by the President, but as a statement on behalf of the entire American people in the face of a great collective trauma. In proclaiming the indelibility of the attack and expressing outrage at its "dastardly" nature, the speech worked to crystallize and channel the response of the nation into a collective response and resolve.〔Neil J. Smelser, in ''Cultural Trauma and Collective Identity'', p. 69. University of California Press, 2004. ISBN ISBN 0-520-23595-9.〕 The first paragraph of the speech was carefully worded to reinforce Roosevelt's portrayal of the United States as the innocent victim of unprovoked Japanese aggression. The wording was deliberately passive. Rather than taking the active voice—i.e. "Japan attacked the United States"—Roosevelt chose to put in the foreground the object being acted upon, namely the United States, to emphasize America's status as a victim.〔James Jasinski, ''Sourcebook on Rhetoric: key concepts in contemporary rhetorical studies''. Sage Publications Inc, 2001. ISBN 0-7619-0504-9.〕 The theme of "innocence violated" was further reinforced by Roosevelt's recounting of the ongoing diplomatic negotiations with Japan, which the president characterized as having been pursued cynically and dishonestly by the Japanese government while it was secretly preparing for war against the United States.〔Hermann G. Steltner, "War Message: December 8, 1941 — An Approach to Language", in ''Landmark Essays on Rhetorical Criticism'' ed. Thomas W. Benson. Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1993. ISBN 1-880393-08-5.〕 Roosevelt consciously sought to avoid making the sort of more abstract appeal that had been issued by President Woodrow Wilson in his own speech to Congress in April 1917, when the United States entered World War I. Wilson laid out the strategic threat posed by Germany and stressed the idealistic goals behind America's participation in the war. During the 1930s, however, American public opinion turned strongly against such themes and was wary of, if not actively hostile to, idealistic visions of remaking the world through a "just war". Roosevelt therefore chose to make an appeal aimed more at the gut level—in effect, an appeal to patriotism rather than to idealism. Nonetheless, he took pains to draw a symbolic link with the April 1917 declaration of war; when he went to Congress on December 8, 1941, he was accompanied by Edith Bolling Wilson, President Wilson's widow.〔Emily S Rosenberg, ''A Date Which Will Live: Pearl Harbor in American Memory''. Duke University Press, 2003. ISBN 0-8223-3206-X.〕 The "infamy framework" adopted by Roosevelt was given additional resonance by the fact that it followed the pattern of earlier narratives of great American defeats. The Battle of the Little Bighorn in 1876 and the sinking of the USS ''Maine'' in 1898 had both been the source of intense national outrage and a determination to take the fight to the enemy. Defeats and setbacks were on each occasion portrayed as being merely a springboard towards an eventual and inevitable victory. As Professor Sandra Silberstein observes, Roosevelt's speech followed a well-established tradition of how "through rhetorical conventions, presidents assume extraordinary powers as the commander in chief, dissent is minimized, enemies are vilified, and lives are lost in the defense of a nation once again united under God."〔Sandra Silberstein, ''War of Words: Language, Politics, and 9/11'', p. 15. Routledge, 2002. ISBN 0-415-29047-3.〕 Roosevelt expertly employed one of the three terms defined by the ancient Sophists as essential to their definition of rhetoric. Coming from over two thousands years ago, the idea of kairos, which relates to speaking in a timely manner, makes this speech powerful and rhetorically important. Delivering his speech on the day after the attack on Pearl Harbor, Roosevelt presented himself as immediately ready to face this issue, indicating its importance to both him and the nation. As Campbell notes in ''Deeds Done in Words: Presidential Rhetoric and the Genres of Governance'', war rhetoric is similar to inaugural rhetoric in that the speaker utilizes their speech to inform their audience that now is the necessary time for them to take charge. In this sense, the timing of the speech in coordination with Roosevelt’s powerful war rhetoric allowed the immediate and almost unanimous approval of Congress to go to war. Essentially, Roosevelt’s speech and timing extended his executive powers to not only declaring war but also making war, a power that constitutionally belongs to Congress. The overall tone of the speech was one of determined realism. Roosevelt made no attempt to paper over the great damage that had been caused to the American armed forces, noting (without giving figures, as casualty reports were still being compiled) that "very many American lives have been lost" in the attack. However, he emphasized his confidence in the strength of the American people to face up to the challenge posed by Japan, citing the "unbounded determination of our people". He sought to reassure the public that steps were being taken to ensure their safety, noting his own role as "Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy" (the United States Air Force was at this time part of the U.S. Army) and declaring that he had already "directed that all measures be taken for our defense." Roosevelt also made a point of emphasizing that "our people, our territory and our interests are in grave danger" and highlighted reports of Japanese attacks in the Pacific between Hawaii and San Francisco. In so doing, he sought to silence the isolationist movement which had campaigned so strongly against American involvement in the war in Europe. If the territory and waters of the continental United States—not just outlying possessions such as the Philippines—was seen as being under direct threat, isolationism would become an unsustainable course of action. Roosevelt's speech had the desired effect, with only one Representative (Jeannette Rankin) voting against the declaration of war he sought; the wider isolationist movement collapsed almost immediately. The speech's "infamy" line is often misquoted as "a ''day'' that will live in infamy". However, Roosevelt quite deliberately chose to emphasize the ''date''—December 7, 1941—rather than the ''day'' of the attack, a Sunday, which he mentioned only in the last line when he said, "...Sunday, December 7th, 1941,...". He sought to emphasize the historic nature of the events at Pearl Harbor, implicitly urging the American people never to forget the attack and memorialize its date. Notwithstanding, the term "day of infamy" has become widely used by the media to refer to any moment of supreme disgrace or evil.〔"Day of infamy", ''Merriam-Webster's Dictionary of Allusions'', ed. Elizabeth Webber, Mike Feinsilber. Merriam-Webster, 1999. ISBN 0-87779-628-9.〕 抄文引用元・出典: フリー百科事典『 ウィキペディア（Wikipedia）』 ■ウィキペディアで「Infamy Speech」の詳細全文を読む スポンサード リンク
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